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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.
that the

Whether the

court properly

plaintiff discovered,

acted in

making a finding

or through the use of reasonable

diligence, should have discovered that he had sustained an injury
and that

the injury was caused by negligent action more than two

years before he

commenced

an

action

against

the

health care

providers named in this action•
2.

Whether

other pleadings in
preclude

the

plaintiff's
this

court

case

from

affidavit
present

and deposition and the
questions

of

fact that

entering summary judgment against the

plaintiff.
3.

Whether the case of Foil v.

Ballinger is

still law in

Utah.
4.

Whether the special statute of limitations set forth in

the Health Care Malpractice

Act

violates

appellant's

right to

equal protection under the Utah State Constitution and the United
States Constitution.
5.

Whether there is a

conflict of

law in

Section 78-14-

4(1)(b) and Section 78-12-26(3) of the Utah Code.
6.

Whether there

was sufficient purpose in the shortening

of statute of limitations in the

Health Care

Malpractice Act to

warrant special considerations to Health Care Providers.

7

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The

Honorable

Richard

H.

Moffat

District Court of Salt Lake County
1987

granting

summary

judgment

of

the

issued an

Third Judicial

Order on

July 20,

in favor of all the defendants

based on the following finding:
THAT AS A MATTER OF LAW, the plaintiff discovered
or through the exercise of reasonable diligence should
have discovered that he had sustained an injury and
that the injury was caused by negligent action more
than two years before he commenced an action against
the health care providers; consequently, his claims of
medical malpractice are barred by the statute of
limitations prescribed in Utah Health Care Malpractice
Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 (1953, as amended).
(R 186 and 187, Order)
The court, without hearing
order.

any evidence,

issued the above

From that action, this appeal is taken.

STATEMENT OF FACT?
This is

a case of medical malpractice against Dr. Martin C.

Lindem, St. Mark's Hospital, and Dr.
of their

negligence in

Charles Floyd in

Lynn L.

performing stomach

December,

1981, and

Wilcox arising out
surgery on appellant

treatment

that occurred

thereafter to appellant, Charles Floyd.
The appellant

contends that there are disputed questions of

fact which a trial court must

resolve and

that the

granting of

Summary Judgment by the Court in this action was improper.
8

Appellant

claims

that

during

the

operation,

without

appellant's knowledge or consent, Dr. Lindem performed additional
surgery and

opened up

the lower

the vagus nerves (truncal
suffered

from

diarrhea

stomach (pyloroplasty) and cut

vagotomy).
and

Thereafter, the appellant

dumping syndrome which has made it

almost impossible for appellant to

work

or

otherwise

live any

type of normal life.
In

April,

1982, appellant,

Lindem about the

surgical

after

procedures

quizzing Dr. Martin C.

performed

upon

him, was

informed by Dr. Martin C. Lindem that additional surgery had been
performed upon him.

However,

appellant

was

informed

that all

surgical procedures performed were a necessary part of the hiatal
hernia repair and were
At this

necessary to

time, appellant

was further told by Dr. Lindem that the

problems he was then experiencing
three years.

(R.

correct reflux esophagitis.

would

resolve

within

two to

171 - 174, also R 199, Floyd deposition pages

97 and 98, 102)
Appellant did
surgery to

not

become

that

the

December, 1981

his lower stomach and the cutting of the vagus nerves

were not necessary or a part
mid 1985.

aware

of the

hiatal hernia

repair until

(R. 171-174, R 199, Floyd deposition, page 102)

Appellant

is

entitled

to

have

the

construed most strongly in his favor and the

facts

of

this case

facts of

this case

indicate that appellant did not become aware that the health care
providers were negligent in their treatment and the
9

surgery they

performed upon

appellant until

of the defendants1 negligence

the mid part of 1985. Discovery

was not

made until

appellant was

told by another physician that the vagotomy and pyloroplasty were
not necessary for the hiatal hernia
conditions from

further that the

which appellant suffered were probably permanent

and would not improve.
Within

repair and

five

(R 171-174)

months

of

making

this

discovery, appellant

obtained counsel,

had the matter reviewed by a competent surgeon

in

prepared

Florida,

Litigation

and
on

November

statute) and served
providers November
Litigation was in

his

27, 1985

the

same

27, 1985.
fact

Notice

served

(still

upon
The

of

the

Intent

to Commence

within the four-year
defendant

health care

Notice of Intent to Commence

within

the

four-year statutory

period.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The court

should have at least held an evidentiary hearing,

after discovery was completed,
appellant discovered

on

negligence.

all

ascertain

when

in

fact the

the alleged negligence or malpractice.

Court should have allowed the
evidence

to

issues

The court

case

concerning

to

go

to

trial

discovery

committed error

and heard
the alleged

in granting defendants1

motion for summary judgment based upon a finding:

10

of

The

THAT AS A MATTER OF LAW# the plaintiff discovered
or through the exercise of reasonable diligence should
have discovered that he had sustained an injury and
that the injury was caused by negligent action more
than two years before he commenced an action against
the health care providers;
(R 187, Order)
Appellant filed an Affidavit
deposition (R

199) that

(R 171)

and testified

in his

he did not or could not have discovered

defendants1 negligence until

mid

1985.

Therefore,

there are

clearly questions of fact that preclude the above finding entered
by the court.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
IS
PROPER
ONLY
IF PLEADINGS,
DEPOSITIONS, AFFIDAVITS, AND ADMISSIONS SHOW THAT THERE
IS NO GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT AND THAT THE
MOVING PARTY IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF
LAW.

If there is any doubt or uncertainty concerning questions of
fact,
party.

that
Thus

doubt
the

should
Court

reasonable inferences

be
must

resolved in favor of the opposing
evaluate

all

evidence,

and all

fairly drawn from the evidence, in a light

most favorable to the party opposing

summary judgment

[Rules of

Civil Procedure, Rule 56(c)] Frisbee vs. K & K. Construction Co,,
676 P.2d 387, (Utah, 1984).

11

On a motion for summary judgment, the judge is
neither required nor permitted to find facts which are
in issue but can only find that there are no genuine
issues of fact to be found and that one party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Carr vs>
Bradshaw Chevrolet Co., 464 P2d 580, 23 Utah 2d 415,
(Utah, 1970).
Based upon the ruling
erred in

in

Carr

v.

Bradshaw,

Judge Moffat

making the finding which supported his Summary Judgment

because the court failed to consider the deposition and affidavit
of appellant stating that discovery of the defendants' negligence
did not occur until mid 1985.
The issues of fact raised by appellant and not considered by
the court are:
1)

When

sustained an injury

did

the

through

appellant

the

discover

negligence

of

that
a

he had

health care

provider?
2)

Did appellant

in fact

Commence an action within

two years of making that discovery? and
3)

Was the action commenced within a time that did not

exceed four years after the alleged negligent act?
This appeal

clearly shows

that there

is ample evidence of

fact which would prevent entry of a summary judgment in
defendants.

12

favor of

POINT II
APPELLANT'S CLAIMS ARE NOT
LIMITATIONS SECTION 78-14-4.

BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF

Appellant's

barred

Limitations

claims

Section

are

not

78-14-4,

Utah

by

Code

the

Statute

Annotated,

1953

of
as

amended, because appellant filed his claim within two years after
the

appellant

or

patient

discovered,

reasonable diligence should have
negligently injured.

or

discovered,

through
that

the use of
he

had been

Appellant stated in his deposition that in

April, 1982, he and his wife and Dr. Lindem discussed appellant's
surgery as follows:
Q.
A.

And Dr. Lindem at that time told you that he
had done additional surgery?
Yes, sir.
She (appellant's wife) directly
asked him what all they had done, and he
said, We repaired the hernia, we removed a
portion of his stomach that was covered with
ulcer scars, tissue, we cut the nerves in his
stomach and opened up the bottom of his
stomach so he can process his food faster.
And he said, with this type of surgery,
it's just going to take time for him to get
over it. And my wife said, Well, how much
time? It's already been several months. And
he said, Sometimes it takes as long as two or
three years before you -- your system gets
back to normal.

(R 199: Floyd Deposition, pp. 96-97, lines 15-25 and 1.)
Q.
A.

And your understanding was from Dr. Lindem
that it might take two or three years for
those symptoms to improve?
That is correct.

(R 199: Floyd Deposition, p. 98, lines 3-5)

13

Appellant Charles Floyd
told him

that it

would take

again

reiterated

that

Dr. Lindem

time to get over the problems from

which he was suffering:
Q.

A.

Q.

A,

Q«

A.

Was it your understanding, then, in September
of 1982, that if diet and medications didn't
help the dumping syndrome, surgery was going
to be necessary or you can live with the
problem?
Well, he said that surgery was the last
resort. He said that what he recommended was
trying to take care of it with medication and
through diet.
How did you feel when you learned from Dr.
Lindem that he had done more surgery than
you'd asked him to do and authorized him to
do?
Well, at that particular time, you know, I
didn't
really
realize
that
he'd done
something that I hadn't
authorized.
I
thought that was part of the procedure to
correct the hernia. I guess I have to admit
it, I'm a dummy, I didn't know.
I take it you did not know that dumping
syndrome was a complication of the surgery
that you thought Dr. Lindem was going to
perform?
That's right.

(Record 199: Floyd Deposition, p. 102, lines 1-19)
In Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P2d 144 (Utah, 1979), at page 148,
the court held that the term "discovery of injury" in the Statute
of Limitations Section of the Health
the discovery

Act means

of an injury and knowledge of the negligence which

caused the injury.

The

instant

Ballinger

the

appellant

in

Care Malpractice

that

case

is

to

Foil v.

did not know of his right of

action for malpractice until he discovered

14

similar

that the unauthorized

surgery was not a necessary part of the hiatal hernia repair that
he had undergone in December, 1981.
In Foil v. Ballinger the claimant, although she knew she had
a

permanent

subarachnoid

phenol

block,

did not know that the

rectal and bladder problems she had were caused

primarily by the

causative agents of the block administered in January, 1974. The
medical report of a
her

with

the

Workers Compensation

first

opportunity

to

medical panel provided

discover the cause of her

continuing disabilities; and, thereafter, the claimant
to have

filed an

was found

appropriate claim and legal proceedings within

the two year statutory period.

The Utah

Supreme Court,

at page

147, held that:
In the health care field it is
typically the case that there often is a great
disparity in the knowledge of those who provide
health care services and those who receive the
services with respect to expected and unexpected
side effects of a given procedure, as well as the
nature, degree, and extent of expected after
effects. While the recipient may be aware of a
disability or dysfunction, there may be, to the
untutored understanding of the average layman, no
apparent connection between the treatment provided
by a physician and the injury suffered.
Even if
there is, it may be passed off as an unavoidable
side effect or a side effect that will pass with
time.
Indeed, common experience teaches that one
often suffers pain and other physical difficulties
without knowing or suspecting the true cause, and
may, as often happens, ascribe a totally erroneous
cause to the manifestations. . . But when the
injuries are suffered that have been caused by an
unknown act of negligence by an expert, the law
ought not to be construed to destroy a right of
action before a person even becomes aware of the
existence of that right.
15

Furthermore, to adopt a construction of §7814-4 that encourages a person who experiences an
injury, dysfunction, or ailment,
and has no
knowledge of its cause, to file a lawsuit against
a health care provider to prevent a statute of
limitations from running is not consistent with
the unarguable sound proposition that unfounded
claims should be strongly discouraged. One of the
chief purposes of the Utah Health Care Malpractice
Act was to prevent the filing of unjustified
lawsuits against health care providers, with all
the attendant costs, economic and otherwise, that
such suits entail.
It would also be imprudent to adopt a rule
that might tempt some health care providers to
fail to advise patients of mistakes that have been
made and
even to
make efforts to suppress
knowledge of such mistakes in hope that the
running of the statute of limitations would make a
valid cause of action nonactionable.
. . . That is, they favor the view that the
two-year provision does not commence to run until
the injured person knew or should have known that
he had sustained an injury and that the injury was
caused by negligent action.
Foil v. Ballinger,
601 P2d 144, pp. 147-148 (Utah, 1979). (Emphasis
added)
In this case there
whether the

is certainly

a question

of fact

as to

appellant reasonably believed the doctor when he was

told that it may take two to three years before
get back to normal.

16

his system would

POINT III
THE CASE OF FOIL V, BALLINGER IS STILL THE LAW IN UTAH.
CASES CITED BY DEFENSE COUNSEL IN MEMORANDA SUBMITTED
TO THE COURT IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTIONS TO DISMISS OR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ARE DISTINGUISHABLE FROM THE FACTS IN
THE APPELLANT'S CASE.
In Magoc

v. Hooker,

796 F2d

377 (Utah,

cases relied upon by defendants, the
about

two

months

after

attorney wrote a letter to
1981,

stating

that

the

an

claimant hired

alleged

the

1986), one of the

injury.

defendant

an attorney

Thereafter, the

doctor

on

April 29,

claimant and his attorney believed the

injury was caused by negligence

in

Utah.

Said

attorney then

failed to commence action until September 12, 1983 (more than two
years after the apparent discovery).
The other case
Limberg,

598

upon

F.Supp

152

parent and guardian ad
negligence of

which

defendants

(Utah,

litem

1984),

indicated

relied,

Hargett v.

is a case wherein the
she

was

aware

of the

the defendant doctor on February 18, 1979 and gave

testimony that at that

time

she

told

another

doctor

at Utah

Valley Hospital that she believed Dr. Limberg had been negligent.
The parent

and

February 16,

guardian

then

failed

to

file

a

claim until

1983 -- well beyond the two-year limitation period.

Also, there were no
raise questions

affidavits or

other evidence

to explain or

of fact as to whether the statute of limitations

had run.

17

The cases relied upon by defendants are distinguishable from
the matter

herein considered because unlike the present case, in

the cases relied upon
plaintiff's

by

defendants,

representative

admitted

either
that

the

plaintiff or

they

knew

negligence and then failed to file a claim within two
this case, plaintiff specifically

denies that

of

years.

the
In

he discovered or

should have discovered the negligence until he was so informed by
another doctor

and that

he thereafter

filed a claim within two

years.
In addition, both Magoc v. Hooker and Hargett v. Limberg are
federal cases

rather than

cases from the Utah Supreme Court and

are not necessarily binding upon this Court.
Basic principles of civil

procedure provide

that the party

opposing a motion for summary judgment is entitled to the benefit
of all favorable inferences.
(Utah,

1977).

There

Durham

clearly

v. Margetts,

571 P2d 1332

are questions of fact raised in

plaintiff's deposition and plaintiff's affidavit, which show that
plaintiff did

not know or could not have known prior to mid 1985

that there had been
the treatment

negligence by

he had

received.

the health

care providers in

Affidavits in

opposition to a

motion for summary judgment are to be liberally construed against
summary judgment.

Sutton

v. Brown,

85 Idaho

104, 375 P2d 990

(Idaho, 1962).
There are still questions of fact to be decided by the Trier
of Fact.

Learned defense counsel, in their memoranda, cite facts
18

that may

indicate to

them with

that the

plaintiff, early in this matter, had the opportunity to

become aware of unauthorized
said counsel

to be

medical procedures

malpractice.

layman, a person (with only a
renting

oil

their medical/legal background,

drilling

The plaintiff,

high school

equipment

original

hiatal

hernia

and its accouterments, and had

procedure.

ascertain until a later date
suffered

were

related

to

however, is a

education) engaged in

been told that all procedures done were necessary
the

which appear to

that
the

and a

part of

The plaintiff did not

the

problems

surgery

which

from

which he

he subsequently

learned was not an integral part of the hiatal hernia repair.

POINT IV

THERE IS A QUESTION OF FACT AS TO WHETHER THERE WAS AN
ATTEMPT TO CONCEAL THE FACTS FROM THE APPELLANT,
WHETHER THERE WAS UNNECESSARY SURGERY AND UNAUTHORIZED
SURGERY, AND WHETHER APPELLANT DID BRING THIS ACTION ON
A TIMELY BASIS.
In appellant's affidavit, appellant stated that

he was told

by defendant Dr. Martin C. Lindem that it would take two to three
years for appellant's condition to remedy itself.
paragraph
learn

4

until

unnecessary

of
mid
and

appellant's
1985
he

did

that

Affidavit.)
pyloroplasty

file

(R 171

-- See

The appellant did not
and

vagotomy

were

his Notice of Intent to Commence

19

Legal Action within one year of

that discovery,

(R

173 — See

paragraphs 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of affidavit of appellant.)
There is clearly a question of fact presented by appellant's
affidavit and deposition.

Succinctly stated, the question

is as

i

follows:

Did the health care providers attempt to conceal facts

from the appellant and prevent him from discovering the injury he
sustained and negligence involving the subject injury?
A

review

of

the

affidavit

appellantfs deposition and
there exists

and

appellant's

statements
complaint

cited

in

indicate that

a question of fact as to the concealment alleged by

the defendant Martin C. Lindem's actions.

(See R 171-175, R 199

Charles Floyd deposition pp. 96-97, R 2-20)
Appellant
fact that

has

clearly

timely brought.

set

forth

indicate
There

his position on the questions of

that

appellant's

action

has been

are no counter affidavits or depositions

to the contrary.

POINT V
THE SPECIAL STATUTE OF LIMITATION AS SET FORTH IN THE
UTAH HEALTH CARE MALPRACTICE ACT VIOLATES APPELLANT'S
RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER STATE LAW AND ALSO
DENIES APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO FREE AND UNFETTERED ACCESS
TO THE COURTS AS
GUARANTEED BY
THE UTAH STATE
CONSTITUTION AND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.
The Utah
the great

case of

disparity

Foil v. Ballinger, cited infra, mentioned

between

untutored
20

laymen

and

the highly

trained physician.

Ballinger further reiterates the proposition

that the

not to

law ought

action before

be construed

to destroy

a right of

a person can become aware of the existence of that

right.
There are cases indicating a trend that special
limitation for

Health Care Providers violate the rights of equal

protection and access to
Kenyon v.

statutes of

the courts.

An

Arizona case entitled

Hammerf 688 P2d 961 (Ariz. 1984), cited and recognized

in Utah Case of Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corporation, 717

P2d 670

(Utah 1985) at page 675, appears to be directly in point.
In

Kenyon

blood type

v.

during

Hammer,
the

a

course

nurse had erroneously recorded a
of

a

woman's

pregnancy

as Rh

positive when in fact it was Rh negative.

If the doctor had been

properly advised of

woman's

negative,

he

would

the

fact

have

the

administered

suppresses the immune response
To be

that

RhoGAM,

Rh negative

blood
a

drug

was Rh
which

mothers may develop.

effective, the drug had to be administered within 72 hours

after delivery of the first child.
and some

The drug was not administered

five year later Mrs. Kenyon delivered a stillborn child

and subsequently
tragedies to

underwent

protect her

tubal

own health.

found that the action by the
and consequently

did not

skills or training and

ligation

nurse was

to

prevent further

The Arizona trial court
merely a

clerical error

involve professional judgment, special

therefore

was

not

entitled

treatment under the Arizona Health Care Statute.
21

to special

The Arizona
against

a

reasonably

Health Care

statute was

certain

class

of

discover

the

fact

tort

found to discriminate

claimants

five

years

later

and

suffered

negligent act.

the

became pregnant

consequences of the

Care Act,

discussing

the

constitutionality of

found the appropriate test to be applied

was the Strict Scrutiny test which holds that a statute
be upheld
and

the

not

I

The Arizona Court, in
their Health

could

that they had been injured until

subsequently when a person, such as Mrs. Kenyon,
some

who

if there

is a

regulation

is

may only

compelling state interest to be served
necessary

objective.

to

achieve

the legislative

|

The Arizona

court held that the right to recover for bodily

injuries is a fundamental right in
Arizona Constitution.

At

Arizona as

guaranteed by the

page 976, the court stated that there

was no compelling state interest "in providing economic relief to
one segment

of society

by depriving those who have been wronged

of access to, and remedy by, the judicial system."
Further, the court stated:
any
profession .
. . experiencing
difficulty could be made the beneficiary of special
legislation to ameliorate its economic adversity by
limiting access to the courts by those who have been
damaged.
Under such a system our constitutional
guarantees would be gradually eroded until this state
became no more than a playground for the privileged and
influential.
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That part of the Arizona Health Care Statute dealing with an
absolute bar

three

years

from

the

date

of

injury

was held

unconstitutional.
The court finally held:
It is one thing, however to regulate by
classification in setting up reasonable periods
within which to bring an action, and it is another
thing to confer special privilege upon one class
of
defendants
by effectively abolishing the
opportunity for
those
with
even
the most
meritorious claims to assert them.
The case
The

Utah

at bar is similar to the Arizona case cited above.

Health

Care

Malpractice

Act

accords

health

care

providers a shortened statute of limitations for situations where
a claimant alleges that a health care provider

has affirmatively

acted to fraudulently conceal the alleged misconduct.
Utah Code Annotated §78-14-4(1)(b) states:
In an action where it is alleged that a
patient has been prevented from discovering
misconduct on the part of a health care
provider because that health care provider
has
affirmatively
acted to fraudulently
conceal the alleged misconduct, the claim
shall be barred unless commenced within one
year
after
the
plaintiff
or
patient
discovers, or through the use of reasonable
diligence,
should
have
discovered
the
fraudulent
concealment,
whichever
first
occurs.
In Utah there is a
with actions

general

statute

of

limitation dealing

based upon fraud which is Section 78-12-26(3) which

states:
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Within three years: (3)
An action for
relief on the ground of fraud or mistake; but
the cause of action in such case shall not be
deemed to have accrued until the discovery by
the aggrieved party of the facts constituting
the fraud or mistake.
Under Utah law, actions have been allowed for numerous years
after the event so long as the time

plaintiff brings

the action

is within three years after the discovery of the mistake. Madsen
v. Madsen# 269 P2d 132 (Utah, 1929).
Actions based upon
profession

should

not

fraudulent
be

concealment

protected;

they

by

the medical

basically

involve

dishonesty, fraud, malice, etc. Fraudulent concealment certainly
does not foster or improve professional judgment, special skills,
or training that is

to

be

encouraged

and

to

be

entitled to

special treatment under the Utah Health Care Statute.
Utah Constitution Article I, Section 11 states:
All courts shall be open, and every
person, for an injury done to him in his
person, property or reputation, shall have
remedy by due course of law, which shall be
administered without denial or unnecessary
delay; and no person shall be barred from
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal
in this State, by himself or counsel, any
civil cause to which he is a p^rty.

In Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp, at page 675, the Utah court
said:
A plain reading of section 11 also establishes
that the framers of the Constitution intended that an
individual could
not be
arbitrarily deprived of
24

effective remedies designed to protect basic individual
rights.
A constitutional guarantee of access to the
courthouse was not intended by the founders to be an
empty gesture; individuals are also entitled to remedy
by "due course of law11 for injuries to "person ,
property, or reputation.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court in referring to
the history of that state's similarly worded open
courts provision stated that it was intended to secure
adequate remedies for violated rights.
The court
stated:
The concept of allowing a reasonable
period of time for suit to be brought after
the cause of action arises is not new in our
law, for along with "substantive rights, the
first settlers brought over the individual
rights of adequate remedy and convenient
procedure." State v. Saunders/ 66 N.H. 39,
74, 25 A. 588, 589 (1889). Thus the "right
to an adequate remedy
[exists] for the
infringement of a right derived from the
unwritten law." 1(3, 25 A. at 589.
When it
came to establish a post-revolution form of
government,
the
first
part
of
our
Constitution [which included an open courts
provision] was devoted to chronicling our
inherent rights.
The provision
demand

that

no

"remedy by due course of law" would appear to
special

treatment

be

given

to

Health

Care

providers who act to fraudulently conceal their misconduct.
In this

matter, Dr.

three years for the
certainly designed

Lindemfs comment

Claimant's condition

"It will take two to
to remedy

itself" was

to give claimant continued hope that he would

improve and could certainly have dissuaded appellant from seeking
other

opinions

condition.
escaping

and

information

It also gave the
liability

for

his

about

health

the

care

true nature of his

provider

a

means of

negligence in luring the potential
25

claimant into a false sense of security.

Then, after waiting for

two to three years to pass, the health care provider is insulated
from suit

because

sooner.

The

the

health

claimant
care

counsel, that claimant
because

it

was

have

diligence should

then

courts

seem

have discovered,

to

his problems

to conceal

which were

be

and he did not

shortened health care

statute of

limitations and

from the claimant the true nature of

created by

the misconduct

of the tort

I
notion

of

justice

Section 11 of Article I of
courts shall

be open

privilege

and

and every

to

fair

Utah State

course of law, demand that no
special

through the use

rewarding the tort feasor by

feasor.
The

the concealment

|

giving him protection by a shortened
encouraging him

argues, through his

discover, or

In this case at hand, by applying the
our

his plight

and he is now precluded from

bring his action within one year.

statute,

discover

discovered

apparent

bringing action because he did not
of reasonable

not

provider

should

readily

did

play in our society and

Constitution, stating all

person shall have remedy by due

group

or

entity

shall

be given

affirmatively act to fraudulently conceal

their actions.
In Berry v. Beech

Aircraft

Corp.,

cited

infra,

The Utah

Court said at page 672:
To be constitutional, a statute of limitations
must allow a reasonable time for the filing of an
action after a cause of action arises.
Horn v.
26

Shaffer, 47 Utah 55, 151 P. 555 (1915); Saylor v. Hall,
Ky., 497 S.W.2d 218 (1973).
In Wilson v. Iseminger,
185 U.S. 55, 62, 22 S.Ct. 573, 575, 46 L.Ed. 804
(1902), the United States Supreme Court stated:
It may be properly conceded that all statutes
of limitation must proceed on the idea that
the party has full opportunity afforded him
to try his right in the courts.
A statute
could
not
bar
the existing rights of
claimants without affording this opportunity;
if it should do so, it would not be a statute
of limitations, but an unlawful attempt to
extinguish rights arbitrarily, whatever might
be the purport of its provisions.
It is
discovered,

for
or

a

finder

through

of
the

fact

to

exercise

decide
of

when

Mr. Floyd

reasonable diligence

ascertained, that he had been

injured

providers' negligence.

finding must be based upon the way

This

through

the

the facts were presented to him and also in light

health care

of the conduct

of the health care provider in his actions in his comments and in
his statements to the claimant as to when

the ultimate condition

or

final

result

of

the

claimant

had

been

reached.

statements of continued assurance to

the

claimant

that

Such
he was

going to be all right or he was going to continue to improve must
be considered seriously by the finder of fact in arriving at such
determination.

A person

who experiences an injury, dysfunction

or ailment has no knowledge of
comes

by

way

of

knowledge

its cause.
of

discovery.
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It

is not

until he

the cause that he has made the

The Claimant

was

still

seeing

Dr.

Lindem

in

1983 when

assurances were made of his prospective recovery.
It was

not until

1984, when

claimant was told his dumping

syndrome was permanent and irreversible, that
way of

knowledge that

he really

came by

his injury was permanent and irreversible

and that what Dr. Lindem

told

him

was

not

true

—

that his

condition was not going to improve and he was not going to be all
right.
The test is to
have reasonably

ascertain when

discovered, —

Floyd discovered,

or should

not when learned defense counsel

think they would have known or should have known.
In

this

provider's

day,

a

claimant

admonitions

and

who

follows

statements

the

religiously

thereafter be penalized by the mischief played upon
by

the

unscrupulous

health

care

provider.

would

be

before the

that

negligence

of

the
the

court at

claimant
surgeon

the claimant
the

matter

finding with

this point in the proceedings

was
by

care

should not

In

presently pending before this court, a mdre logical
the evidence

health

delayed

the

in

discovering the

surgeon's

own mischief in

advising the potential claimant that he would be all right in two
to three

years.

then

have

we

fraudulent

If this type of mischief is allowed to continue

encouraged

concealment

health

and

we

care
lend

providers
encouragement

allowing a shortened statute of limitations.

28

to

exercise

to them by

If a health care provider engages
fraudulently conceal
the state and

misconduct from

community

circumvented.

are

Justice,

course of law, which

not

fair

shall

a patient

served,

play

be

in affirmative

action to

the interest of

but

are

in reality

and having a remedy by due

administered

without

denial or

unnecessary delay, demand that we not accord special treatment to
a wrongdoer, but that
equally.

See

down

wrongdoer.
and

all

Celebrity

1293,

1296

our

citizenry

Club

(Utah,

fairly and

Inc.

v. Utah Liquor

1982)

and Industrial

Evans, 52 Utah 394, 409, 174 P2d 825, 829 (Utah, 1918).

Therefore, it
strike

treat

generally

Control Com., 657 P2d
Comm. v.

we

fair

a

is

clear

statute

that

that

our

gives

appellate
special

privilege

The court should foster statutes that
to

the

entire

community.

Constitution of the United States

of

court should
to

a

are reasonable

The basic premise of the
America

is

bottomed upon

notions of equality, fair play and equal treatment under the law.
There is no cause to give health care providers special treatment
or consideration when they affirmatively act to conceal their own
misconduct.
The special statute of limitations contained
14-4(1)(b)

is

struck down.
Section

7

clearly

in Section 78-

unconstitutional and must be accordingly

Section 11 and the Due Process Clause

are

related

both

of Article I

in historical origins and to some

extent in their constitutional functions.

Both act

the powers of both the courts and the Legislature.
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to restrict
See Masich v.

U.S. Smelting, Refining & Mining Co, , 113 Utah 101, 191

P2d 612,

623-24 (Utah, 1948).
Finally, as

set forth

on page 676, Berry v. Beech Aircraft

Corp,, cited infra, the court said concerning Article

I, Section

11 of the Utah Constitution:
. . . the basic purpose of Article I, section 11
is to impose some limitation on that power for the
benefit of those persons who are injured in their
persons, property, or reputations
since they are
generally
isolated
in
society,
belong
to
no
identifiable group, and rarely are able to rally the
political process
to their
aid.
Cf. Rosin v.
Lidgerwood Mfg. Co., 89 App.Div. 245, 86 N.Y.S. 49
(1903).
In Utah

there are

three cases

claimant to give notice
These cases

by way

Health Care

Malpractice Act.

of dictum indicate that the Utah Health Care

Malpractice statute is
Univ. of

under the

dealing with failure of the

Utah Med.

not

unconstitutional.

Center, 603

P2d 786

Vernal Family Health Center, 617 P2d

See

McGuire v.

(Utah, 1979), Yates v.

252 (Utah,

1980) and Allen

v. Intermountain Health Care, 635 P2d 30 (Utah, 1981).
these cases do not deal with
where

the

claimant

negligence

along

is

with

a situatiori

precluded
the

injury

like the

Factually

instant case

from making discovery of the
stemming

from

the subject

negligence.

A more enlightened analysis of the cases along with

the case

Berry

of

v.

Beech

Aircraft,

cited

infra,

and its

statements on Article I Section 11 of the Utah State Constitution
clearly show that

the

special

treatmer^t

afforded

providers is unconstitutional under Utah law.
30

health care

POINT VI
CLEARLY THERE IS A CONFLICT OF LAW IN SECTION
78-14-4(1)(b) AND 78-12-26(3) OF THE UTAH CODE.
Utah Code §78-12-26(3) states:
Within three years: (3) An action for relief on
the ground of fraud or mistake; but the cause of action
in such case shall not be deemed to have accrued until
the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts
constituting the fraud or mistake.
Utah Code Annotated §78-14-4(1)(b) states:
In an action where it is alleged that a patient
has been prevented from discovering misconduct on the
part of a
health care provider because that health
care provider has affirmatively acted to fraudulently
conceal the alleged misconduct, the claim shall be
barred unless commenced within one year after the
plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of
reasonable diligence/ should
have
discovered the
fraudulent concealment, whichever first occurs.
Under §78-12-26(3) we have a statute and body of law dealing
with matters involving actions on ground
by the aggrieved party.
year statute after
special statute

discover

to health

limiting

special statute.
amended to

In

on

1979

the

general

care providers

minor's

include the

and discovery

The legislature saw fit to give a three-

similar situation occurred
involving

of fraud

in

Section

claims
the

to

statute

but gave

in §78-14-4(1)(b).

78-14-4(2)
the

provisions

and 78-12-26

provisions
of

A

of the

§78-14-4(2) were

language "notwithstanding the provisions
31

of §78-12-26."
is needed

It would clearly appear that

to clear

up the

a similar amendment

conflict that exists between §78-14-

4(1)(b) and §78-12-26(3).
The Legislature is not deemed to
in

allowing

the

legislature

to

do unnecessary
do

patch

questionable Health Care Malpractice Act one
those

problems

pointed

out

in

Point

work

must be

acts.

But

upon

its

mindful of

VII that concludes this

brief.

POINT VII

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE VICTIMS GENERALLY HAVE NO CONTROL
OVER THE INCEPTION OF THEIR AFFLICTIONS OR ILLNESS AND
EVEN LESS CHOICE CONCERNING THE MEDICAL MIS-, MAL- OR
NON-FEASANCE PRACTICED UPON THEM AND ARE ENTITLED TO AN
EXAMINATION OF THE PURPOSES OF LEGISLATION AS WELL AS A
BALANCING OF THE INTEREST SERVED AND THE INTEREST
BURDENED.
To begin this final point, the court should be aware
great financial
the

medical

of the

disparity between the victim, Charles Floyd, and

doctors,

their

4n(^ well

wealth,

funded medical

association that champions their cause. Mr. Floyd is here before
this court because his attorney has personally financed his cause
to

give

him

become the
Restrictive

his

day

victim's
Medical

in

court. The plaintiff's attorney has

voice.

This

Malpractice

Constitutional "Quid Pro Quo"

is

Compensation

analysis
32

recognized

to

in Learner,
Schemes:

A

Safeguard Individual

Liberties, 18 Harv.J. on Legis. 143, hereinafter cited as Learner
"Quid Pro Quo", at age 186 states:
Malpractice victims
may very
well lack the
physical faculties, and financial resources to mount a
successful challenge to laws curtailing their rights.
The Kansas court in

the

case

of

Coburn,

by

and through

Coburn v. Agustin cited as 627 F.Supp 983 (D.Kan 1985) recognized
that disparity

and

concluded

that

the

rights

at

issue were

sensitive and sufficiently important and further recognized that:
It seems highly unlikely that many individuals
actively contemplate the relatively remote risk that
they may become malpractice victims. The number of
actual victims is not
large enough
to generate
widespread public concern for personal safety, nor is
notice of the restrictive legislation sufficiently
prominent to draw the attention of individuals who may
rationally assume that they continue to possess an
effective judicial remedy.
There is no apparent
impetus to trigger the intense concerns that galvanize
individuals to coalesce into political organizations
that participate actively in the legislative process.

At this writing, at age 46 years, appellant is only
work at

a job

that gives

previously enjoyed due to
suffers --

him about
the serious

dumping syndrome

one-third of the income he
conditions from

and diarrhea.

As

unauthorized negligent surgery,

appellant's

about 10

a normal

minutes what

it take

minutes. (R 199, Charles Floyd Deposition,
dumping results in constant diarrhea.
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able to

which he

a result of the

stomach

empties in

stomach to empty in 77
pages 100-107)

This

Perhaps,

in

the

tests

espoused in the final analysis, we

should ask: Where do you compensate the
him?

Through

the

tort

system

of

victim and rehabilitate
free

enterprise

in

the

capitalistic system or through the welfare system of a socialized
system?
There are

Perhaps, this
few

remaining which

is where

bastions

of

have not

the

the ultimate balancing occurs.
free

enterprise

system still

become eroded into a part of a welfare

state as a result of special legislation.) As stated in Coburn v.
Agustin, cited infra, the Kansas Court concludes:
A fair reading of a long history of procedures
suggests that the constitutional balance should favor
the victims.
Commenting

upon

Coburn v. Agustin that
providers will

an

argument

reduction of

espoused

by

the defense in

awards against

health care

assure the availability of low cost insurance for

the providers, the court states at page 995:
While the Court is willing to follow the somewhat
torturous tautology of asserted purpose, the Court must
examine the factual nexus between the goal of quality
health care and the means of allowing the tort-feasor
to have the benefit of insurance privately purchased by
or for
the tort
victim.
Numerous courts and
commentators have sagely observed that the extending of
special litigation benefits to the medical profession
will do little to protect the public health.
"On the
contrary, the quality of health care may actually
decline.
To the extent that in tort actions of the
malpractice type if the medical profession is less
accountable than formerly,
relaxation
of medical
standards may occur with the public the victim."
Graley v. Satayatham, 343 N.E.2d 832, 838 (Ohio Ct.
Comm. Pleas 1976).
See also Comment, California1s
Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act:
An Equal
Protection Challenge, 52 S.Cal.L. Rev. 829, 854 n. 143
(1979).
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In conclusion,

the court

continued and

commented upon the

Medical Malpractice crisis and stated as follows:
Regarding need, defendants cavalierly refer to the
"obvious" medical malpractice crisis justifying this
legislation.
What is apparently so clear to the
medical profession, the insurance
industry, their
respective lobbyists, and the Legislature is a matter
of deep and growing concern to this Court as well as a
number of commentators and other courts across the
country. In the Legislature's haste to remedy the
situation, it has overlooked, or more likely, ignored
the fundamental cause of the so-called crisis:
it is
the unmistakable result not of excessive verdicts, but
of excessive malpractice by health care providers.
. . . In this case, a privilege is being created
on behalf of doctors and insurance companies, while the
class that pays the price is comprised of injured and
powerless medical malpractice victims. The restriction
of
important
rights
of
a
disadvantaged class
significantly outweighs the benefits sought to be
conferred upon the privileged class.
Section 78-14-2 of the Health Care Malpractice Act
legislative
review the

findings

declarations.

legislative hearings

Act in

1976.

needed

to

guarantee

in

the

continued

passage of this

Bangerter said the act was
writing

of

malpractice

and reduce insurance premiums because of the

number

malpractice claims.

It is interesting to

concerning the

Representative Norman

liability insurance
increase

and

sets out

of

suits

and

judgments

arising

from

Representative Frank Matheson made a motion

which was supported by factual

information

1976,

years prior thereto, there was no

and

in

the

immediate

and

showed

that in

increase in malpractice law suits or excessive judgments in Utah;
35

but there

was actually a decline in the number of cases filed in

Utah's district courts. Representative M^theson

further pointed

out that

Utah was being penalized by what was happening in other

states.

Representative Matheson's amendment, which never passed,

was intended

to delete

was not true in Utah.

most of

Section 78-14-2 because it just

(See Record of Proceedings

in Legislative

Proceedings on Third Reading and Passage of Act, January 30, 1976
available at the House of Representative's office)

CONCLUSION
It clearly appears that the court
upon the

basis of that finding.

required nor permitted to

made a

finding and ruled

The court, however, was neither

find facts; but could

only find that

there were no genuine issues of fact.
Excerpts from

appellant's complaint, appellant's affidavit,

and appellant's deposition, clearly
questions surrounding

establish there

plaintiff's claim.

There

affidavits or depositions that dispute appellant's
did

not

discover

the

negligence

are factual

are no counter
claim that he

of tjie health care providers

until mid 1985.
The case of Foil v. Ballinger is clearly still law
Therefore, the

court must

of knowledge between
layman patient.

The

a

in Utah.

take into account the great disparity

skilled

health

care

provider

and his

patient may be awate of a dysfunction; but
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may make

no apparent

connection between

and the injury suffered.
destroy a

The

law

the treatment received

should

not

be

construed to

right of action before a claimant becomes aware of the

existence of that
respondents, in

right.
support of

The

facts

in

their motions

are clearly distinguishable from

the

cases

cited by

for summary judgment,

the facts

which the

court has

been asked to review in this matter.
There are
certain

questions of fact as to whether the appellant had

information

concealed

from

him

by

the

health

care

providers' actions and statements that it would take two to three
years for the appellant"s system to remedy itself.
Therefore,

the

Court

should

reverse

the

ruling

of the

District Court, indicating that summary judgment was improper and
remand the case for trial on all issues.
Finally, the special shortened statute of
Health

Care

Malpractice

Act

is

in

limitation of the

conflict with the general

statute of limitations and should be declared unconstitutional as
it is

a restriction of important rights of a disadvantaged class

while the same statute rewards and gives a privilege to a special
class of persons, the health care providers, which is not
available to the public at large.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

£>

day of January, 1988.

FAiEftOURN & PESMILL
TJf. CL^^^FAIRBOURN
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I do hereby certify that I mailed four (4) true and correct
copies of Appellant's Brief this +?"* day of January, 1987, to:
Elliott J, Williams
Attorney for Respondent
Western Surgical Associates,
Inc. and Martin C. Lindem
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
J. Anthony Eyre
Attorney for Respondent
Lynn L. Wilcox
KIPP & CHRISTIAN
City Centre I, #330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Gary D. Stott
Attorney for Respondent
St. Marks Hospital
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
50 South Main Street, #700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
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D. Clayton Fairbourn, A1028
FAIRBOURN & PESHELL
Attorney for Plaintiff
7321 South State Street
Midvale, UT 84047
Telephone: (801) 255-3591
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
-ooOooCHARLES FLOYD,
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT

VS.

Civilf No. 86-2223

WESTERN SURGICAL ASSOCIATES,
INC., MARTIN C. LINDEM, JR.,
M.D., LYNN L. WILCOX, M.D.,
and ST. MARK'S HOSPITAL,

Judge Richard Moffat

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

)

County of Salt Lake )

ss.

CHARLES FLOYD, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
1.

He is the plaintiff in the above entitled action.

2.

In April, 1982, plaintiff and his wife were informed by

Dr. Martin C. Lindem that at the time of the surgery to
hiatal hernia

in December

of 1981, scar tissue was removed, the

bottom of plaintiff's stomach was opened
his food

repair a

up so

he could process

faster, and the nerves to plaintiff's stomach were cut,

and that all of the procedures

referred to

39

above were necessary

ooo*

to properly

repair the hiatal hernia and condition from which he

suffered.
3.

Plaintiff is merely

never studied

the stomach

relied upon his doctors'
problems.

The

a

high

nor the

school

graduate

digestive system.

representations concerning

doctors

and has
Plaintiff

his stomach

never fully explained to plaintiff the

procedures or the full problem that

he had

or that

some of the

surgeries performed were not connected to or necessary for repair
of the hiatal hernia.
4.

In the subject conversation, Dr. Lindem stated:
a.

were

the

The conditions from which

natural

or

expected

plaintiff was suffering

consequences

of

the

subject

procedures; and
b.

It would take plaintiff

two

to

three

years for

plaintiff's condition to remedy itself so that plaintiff would no
longer

suffer

from

severe

depression,

upset

stomach,

and

diarrhea.
5.

That

plaintiff

was

from which he suffered were

led

to believe that the problems

unavoidable

side

effects

from the

surgery he had received for the hiatal hernia.
6.

Dr.

Lindem

told

resolve themselves if he
Dr.

Lindem

then

plaintiff

followed Dr.

prescribed

the

above problems would

Lindem's instructions and

medication

and

dietary

means of

controlling the conditions from which plaintiff was suffering.
2
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7.

Dr.

Lynn

Wilcox

later

also

advised

plaintiff that

plaintiff could control his problems with diet and medication.
8.

It was not until September of 1984, that

advised that
diarrhea,

surgery might be necessary to lessen the problem of

which

was

and

that

syndrome,"

caused
said

by

what

diarrhea

is

known

and

surgery

was

performed

to

as

dumping

appeared to be of a permanent nature and would not
further

plaintiff was

"dumping

syndrome now
change unless

slow down food from exiting

plaintiff's stomach at such a rapid rate.
9.

Until

believed that

September

the

1984,

the

plaintiff

reasonably

the conditions from which he suffered, depression,

upset stomach, and severe
and

of

medications

diarrhea, would

and

diet

control

be corrected
procedures

by time

that

were

recommended by the treating defendant doctors.
10.

It

was not

hospitalization in

until mid

1985, several

September of

1984, that plaintiff discovered

that the upset stomach, dizziness, diarrhea
were results

from the

months after his

and dumping syndrome

pyloroplasty (opening up of lower part of

stomach), and vagotomy (severing of vagus

nerves), and

that his

condition was not going to improve and that the performing of the
pyloroplasty and vagotomy
correct his

were

hiatal hernia,

not

part

of

the

procedure to

curb Barretts Disease and the reflux

esophagitis from which he initially suffered.

3
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11.
the

The plaintiff,

conditions

unnecessary

from

surgery

which
not

hiatal hernia, contacted
whether doctors

upon learning from another surgeon that
he

suffered

related
an

Lindem and

to

attorney

were

a

result

of

the repair of plaintiff's
to

ascertain

and verify

Wilcox had been negligent and if the

negligent treatment caused the

conditions

from

which plaintiff

was suffering.
12.

Later, in November of 1985f plaintiff's attorney caused

plaintiff's medical records to be reviewed by Dr. Edward Woodward
in

Gainesville,

Florida

and

appeared to be negligence by
there appeared

to be

a lack

was
his

informed
treating

that in fact there
physicians

and also

of obtaining informed consent from

plaintiff, by Dr. Martin C. Lindem

prior treating

the plaintiff

in the manner in which the plaintiff was treated.
13.

At this

point, the

plaintiff instructed

four year

his counsel

statute had not run, so

to file

a notice

late November of 1985.
DATED this

£^

day of June, 1987.

,^l^f^
CHARLES FLOYDT
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X

of claim in

SUBSCRIBED AND

SWORN to before me this

23
^^

day of June,

1987.

My Commission Expires:

Residing at:

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I do hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Affidavit this

23

day of June, 1987, to:

Elliot J. Williams
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
J. Anthony Eyre
KIPP & CHRISTIAN
City Centre I, #330
175 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Gary D. Stott
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
50 South Main Street, #700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110

^^ph^fJ
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"LEO IN CLERK'S OFFICE
Salt Lake City. Utah

j p- i :

JUL 2 0 1987
H. Dixcn Htpdlov, clerk ft DisUCourt
V

ELLIOTT J. WILLIAMS (A3483)
ELIZABETH KING BRENNAN (A4863)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendants,
Western Surgical Associates, Inc.
and Martin C. Lindem, Jr., M.D.
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P. 0. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

y
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
CHARLES FLOYD,
Plaintiff,

ORDER

v.
Civil No. 86-2223
WESTERN SURGICAL ASSOCIATES,
INC., MARTIN C. LINDEM, JR.,
M.D., LYNN L. WILCOX, M.D.,
and ST. MARK'S HOSPITAL,

Judge Richard Moffat

Defendants.
The defendants', Western Surgical Associates, Inc.,
Martin C. Lindem, Jr., M.D., Lynn L. Wilcox, M.D. and
St. Mark's Hospital, Motion For Summary Judgment having come
on for argument on June 26, 1987, before the Honorable
Richard Moffat, plaintiff's counsel being represented by
Clayton Fairbourn, and defendants being represented by Elliott
Williams, Anthony Eyre, and Bruce Garner, the Court having
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000186

heard argument on the matter and being fully advised in the
premises, now finds the following:
THAT AS A MATTER OF LAW, the plaintiff discovered or
through the exercise of reasonable diligence should have
discovered that he had sustained an injury and that the
injury was caused by negligent action more than two years
before he commenced an action against the health care providers; consequently, his claims of medical malpractice are
barred by the statute of limitations prescribed in Utah Health
Care Malpractice Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 (1953, as amended) .
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
the defendants1 Motion For Summary Judgment is granted, and that
the above-entitled action is dismissed with prejudice pursuant
to Rule 56, each party to bear their own costs.

DATED this < 3£- d a Y

o f Jul

y* 1987.

ATTEST
H. DIXON HINDLEY
tOep-t^C!erk'
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE

STATE OF UTAH

)
)

ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Lynn F r e a r , b e i n g d u l y s w o r n , s a y s t h a t s h e i s employed i n
law o f f i c e s

of Snow, C h r i s t e n s e n & M a r t i n e a u , a t t o r n e y s f o r

the

Defendants,

Western Surgical A s s o c i a t e s , Inc. and Martin C. Lindem, J r . ,
M.D.
herein; that she served the attached Order

(Case No.

86-2223

S a l t Lake

County) upon t h e p a r t i e s

l i s t e d below by p l a c i n g a true and c o r r e c t copy thereof i n an envelope
addressed t o :

D. Clayton Fairbourn
Fairbourn & P e s h e l l
7321 South S t a t e S t r e e t
Midvale, Utah 84047
J . Anthony Eyre
Kipp and C h r i s t i a n , P.C.
City Center 1, S u i t e 330
175 East 400 South
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111-2314

Gary D. Stott
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson
CSB Tower, Suite 700
50 South Main Street
P. O. Box 2465
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84110

and causing the same t o be mailed, f i r s t c l a s s , postage prepaid, on the
f^day

of

July

1987.
Lyrfn
Ly: Frear

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this Cp^A~' day of

July

1987.

;// PfrkuJV)

My commission expires:

HW-9D

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing in Salt Lake County, Utah
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